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A constitution does not work itself, it has to be worked by men 
[and women] 1
My overall suggestion is that a significant part of New Zealand 
constitutionalism is not judicial or legislative in nature, but 
could be characterised as "office-holders' constitutionalism. "2
Introduction 
In this paper I shall assess the impact of the recent reviews of the Crown Law Office in New 
Zealand and the public legal office of Solicitor-General. In 2011 the State Services Commission, 
The Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet commissioned a review 
of the Crown Law Office as part of Performance Improvement Framework (PIF). The 
Performance Improvement Framework " .. .is a framework applied by a small group of respected 
organisational leaders to provide insights into agency performance, identifying where agencies 
are strong or performing well and where they are weak or need to improve."3 The PIF is part 
of the Better Public Services project that is " ... part of a shift to a more explicit standard of 
defining and tracking performance, changing the nature of incentives in the public sector, 
boosting the role that the corporate centre can play and enhancing the ability of stakeholders 
and the public to scrutinise what they are getting for their tax dollars."4 The Crown Law review 
then was part of a wider review of state agencies that was essentially shifting the focus of the 
agencies to be more efficiency-based and performance driven. 
The PIF is an integral part of the New Public Management (NPM) and much would appear to 
have been invested in it by the three central state sector agencies and the government that has 
promoted and supported the initiative. The Cabinet noted that " ... PIF is expected to become 
a core evaluative tool for the three central agencies, and should allow complete and consistent 
Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (University of London, 5th edn. 1959) 82. 
2 Matthew SR Palmer, "What is New Zealand's constitution and who interprets it? Constitutional 
realism and the importance of public office-holders" (2006) 17 PLR 133, 153. 
3 Formal Review of the Crown Law Office (Crown Law), October, 2011 State Services Commission, The 
Treasury, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet p 10 https://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/ 
files/pif-crownlaw-review-octl l .pdf 
4 Deborah Te Kawa and Kevin Guerin, "Provoking Debate and Learning Lessons it is early days, but 
what does the Performance Improvement Framework challenge us to think about?" Policy Quarterly, 
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feedback from the centre to agencies on performance. "5 The focus of this paper is on one agency, 
the Crown Law Office (CLO) as it has been subject to the PIF-oriented review. The paper will firs t 
situate the public office of Solicitor-General and the Crown Law Office within New Zealand's 
constitutional framework. I t  is argued that although Solicitor-General is a public official and is the 
ChiefExecutive of the CLO understood as a state sector agency, the office of solicitor-general also 
has a constitutional role that may not fit easily with the objectives of the NPM. 
This paper is informed by my experience as A ttorney-General 1999-2005 and the working 
relationship I developed with two Solicitor-Generals who held office during that period. This 
experience gave me an understanding of the reality oflegal risk for government and also 
of the negotia tion required between the government service and public interest roles of the 
A t orney-General. The paper is also informed by the research I undertook for the Judiciary 
Chapter of the New Zealand National Integrity System Assessment.6 This research alerted me 
to the lack of cons titutional understanding of the role of the judiciary that was evidenced in 
the various reviews . The approach appeared to be that judges were jus t like any public official 
whose performance may be judged accordingly. Justice Tipping in his final sitting address 
on the Supreme Court noted the following development at the time of the various reviews of 
the Ministry of Jus tice: "I have a feeling tha t in some quarters the judiciary are seen by the 
executive and i ts officials as simply another section of the Ministry of Justice to be managed, 
like the I T  section and human resources section. The Judges and the profession mus t be vigilant 
to arrest and reverse this unconstitutional tendency."7 
I t  also became apparent tha t the lack ofresourcing for the cour t system for example does have 
an impac t on the quality of justice and the rule of law. A t  the time of this research the repor ts 8 
had been published bu t no t fully implemented. I t  is too soon to make an assessment of the effec t 
of these recommendations .  In many ways the same may be said of the reviews undertaken of 
the Solicitor-General and Crown Law Office.9 The recommendations are being implemented 
however so it has become clear how their performance is to be reviewed. I shall return to the 
issue of performance review later in the paper. 
5 Cabinet Expenditure Control Committee, Office of the Minister of State Services, 3/9/9. 
6 2013, www.transparency.org.nz. 
7 Final Sitting The Right Honourable Justice Andrew Tipping, Friday 17 August 2012, 
https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/news-and-communications/latest-news/2012/justice-andrew-tippings­
final-sitting-speech/Final_Sitting_Address_ -_17 _August_2012.pdf 
8 Follow-Up Review of the Ministry of Justice, 2014 http://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/ 
Publications/pif-follow-up-review-201407. pdf 
9 Review of Public Prosecution Services, 2011, http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Reports/ 
prosecution-review-2011.pdf; A Review of the Role and Functions of the Solicitor-general and Crown 
Law, 2012, http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Reports/review-2012.pdf; Follow Up Review 
of the Crown Law Office (Crown Law) 2013 www.crownlaw.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Reports/pif­
crownlaw-followup.pdf 
10 The lmpact or i:-n-1 ib..:r.1lism L1n thi:- ldl',1 L't Public Ollilc· l '�JI Ot11c·c in ;s..;c\1 / �d.11,d
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The role of the Solicitor-General in Australia 
An understanding of the role of the Solicitor-General requires an understanding of a country's 
constitution and the role of this office within that constitution. Gabrielle Appleby has written 
what is likely to be the definitive text oi;i the role of the Australian Solicitor-General.10 She 
argues that there has been a "myopic focus" on constitutional text and judicial doctrine in the 
study of constitutional law. She argues, with Palmer 11, that this emphasis on institutions has 
been "hopelessly misdescriptive" 12 and led to an undervaluing of other key institutions such as 
constitutional conventions and public legal office (s). She relies on Martin Loughlin's 13 notion 
of 'public law' as includ ing mechanisms that go beyond the constitutional text when it comes 
to understanding constitutional governance. She further argues that Loughlin's definition 
introduces the idea of the constitution as including not just rules but the usage of these rules. 
Appleby's emphasis then is on the constitution in use (as Wittgenstein might say). 
Appleby argues that a complete understanding of how a constitution works in practice requires 
an analysis of the role of the government lawyer, in particular, the Solicitor-General who 
provides legal advice to the Executive on significant matters of constitutional and public 
law. She argues that it is the government lawyers who interpret and advise the Executive 
on constitutional issues; they "act as guards against tyranny and abuse within government." 
She explains further: "It is the rule oflaw and the striving for constitutionalism that serves 
to explain and provide the rationale for the constitutional role of government legal officers, 
including in Australia the primary legal officer, the Solicitor-General."14 The Solicitor-General 
provides the link between the Executive and Judiciary through defending the position of the 
government in the superior courts and through advising the Executive on judicial decisions. 
Although there has been much research and commentary on the position of the Attorney­
General, there is relatively little on the Solicitor-General. The Attorney-General is 
constitutionally the senior legal officer. It is a political as well as a legal office. The Solicitor­
General is the junior legal officer and this is a non-political office. The relationship between the 
two offices is important and under-researched. Appleby's focus is not on this relationship but 
on understanding the lived experience of the Solicitor-General with the purpose of revealing 
the significance of this key public office(r) in the normative or constitutional framework of 
government. She concludes her study with the observation "The Australian position provides 
a framework within which good officeholders can negotiate the law, politics and the public 
10 Gabrielle Appleby, The Role of the Solicitor-General: Negotiating Law, Politics and the Public 
Interest, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2016). 
11 Palmer, n 2. 
12 Karl Llewellyn, "The Constitution as Institution" (1934) 34 Columbia Law Review, 1 4. 
13 MLoughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
14 Appleby, n 6, 6-7 . 
................................... .. ............................................................................................ . ...................... ............. .......... ...... ... . . .......
interest, a normat ive statement they can rely upon in t imes of trouble, and a powerful tool for 
fostering publ ic confidence in the role." 15 
The constitutional role of public office holders in New Zealand 
Although there is no parallel in-depth analys is of the role of Sol ic itor- General in New 
Zealand, Matthew Palmer has argued the importance of understand ing the role of publ ic office 
holders in New Zealand's const itut ional arrangements. 16 He notes that the unwr itten nature 
of the const itut ion means that the principles and convent ions that have become established 
usage become an integral element of the const itution. At the same t ime, and arguably an 
advantage, this form of const itut ion is flexible and subject to change, often suddenly w ithout 
much popular support. Perhaps more importantly these changes often pass unnot iced and 
their impl icat ions not fully apprec iated. He argues that "Our agents of const itut ional change, 
includ ing the executive, the Parliament and the courts, may make changes w ith unidentified, 
unintended or unwanted effects on our const itution. We may not even be aware of who is 
making const itut ional dec is ions." 17 He identifies 80 elements to the New Zealand const itut ion. 
In order to try and understand the s ign ificance or otherwise of these elements, he argues that 
the theoret ical perspect ive of legal realism prov ides the best framework for understand ing the 
nature of New Zealand's const itution. He emphasises that th is perspect ive must include the role 
of publ ic office-holders who interpret and apply elements of the const itut ion. 
He identifies the ten publ ic office-holders that stand out as the most s ignificant in the extent and 
importance of their influence (in rough order of importance and extent of interpretative powers), 
as being: 
The Prime M in ister; 
The Sol ic itor-General; 
The Secretary of the Cab inet/Clerk of the Execut ive Counc il; 
The Clerk of the House of Representat ives; the Governor-General; 
The Attorney-General; 
The State Serv ices Commiss ioner; 
The Controller and Aud itor-General; 
The Speaker of the House of Representat ives; and 
The Ombudsmen. 
15 Appleby n 6, 295. 
16 Palmer, n 2. 
17 Ibid, 133. 
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While there may be some argument and d ispute about the li st and order of ranking, the 
impor tant point i s  that all the se public office s d o  have significant influence on New Zealand's
constitut ion dec isi on s. The nature and extent of tha t influence is n ot fully under stood h owever 
and thi s i s  the e ssential p oint of Palmer' s  analy si s. He conclude s hi s analy si s with the statement 
"My overall sugge sti on i s  that a significant part of New Zealand 's con stitutional ism i s  n ot 
jud icial or leg islat ive in nature but could be characteri sed a s  'officer-holder s '  con stituti onali sm . 
A con stituti on, like other law, can be conce ived a s  'what official s do  about di spute s '  ." 1 8 I w ould 
sugge st that thi s concepti on of an office-holder s '  con stitutionali sm be st capture s the sign ificance 
of the r ole of Solicit or-General. 
That Palmer rate s the Solicitor-General a s  the sec ond publi c office holder in signific ance 
reflect s not only hi s exper ience of w orking in Cr own Law and h olding the p ositi on of Depu ty 
Soli citor -General 19 but al so the empha si s  he place s on the r ole and nature of interpretati on 
in law, including c on stituti onal law. The definiti on of interpretati on u sed by Palmer i s  "the 
detennination, au thoritative in prac tice, of what a conventi on or rule me ans  a s  applied to  a 
particular in stance of doubt or di spute."20 While the jud iciary is influential in the interpretati on 
of law, Pa lmer 's realist analy sis empha si se s wh o actually exerci se s the practical p ower of 
interpre ta ti on from a p osit ion of authority. As the government 's legal advisor, the Solici t or ­
General i s  in reali ty the p rimary interpreter of the law a s  i t  a ffect s the government. Thi s  legal 
advice include s con stitutional advice, and in the New Zealand c ontext th is primarily means 
adv ice a s  to whether the government is acting with in the law. 
Legal Officers - New Zealand 
The Law Officer s of the Cr own are the Attorney-General and the Sol icitor-General with 
the Attorney being the senior officer and the Solic itor the juni or law officer. The Solicit or­
General al so h old s the office of Ch ief Execu tive of the Crown Law O ffice. There have been 
three authoritat ive article s de scrib ing the r ole of the se Law O fficer s, with two of them being 
written by former Solicitor-General s and the other by Matthew Palmer.2 1  Early in b oth New 
Zealand and Australian col onial hi story, the se office s d iverged from the Engli sh m odel with 
1 8  Ibid 153. 
19 He has recently been appointed to the High Court of New Zealand. 
20 Palmer, n 1 52. 
21 John McGrath QC, "Principles for Sharing Law Officer Power - The Role of the New Zealand
Solicitor-General", (1998) 1 8  NZULR 1 97; and Dr David Collins QC, "The Role of Solicitor-General 
in Contemporary New Zealand" Bond University Symposium, April 201 1. 
(http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/NZULR.PDF) and chapter in Appleby, Keyzer and 
Williams (eds) Public Sentinels: A Comparative Study of Australian Solicitors-General (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2014), 171; Matthew Palmer, "Law Officers and department lawyers", New Zealand Law
Journal, November 2011, 333 . 
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the early separat ion of the pol itical and non-political roles. In New Zealand by 1 876 it became 
established that the Attorney-General served both as a M inister and a member of the legisl ature . 
In 1873 the Crown Law Office was establ ished and since that time evolved into a separate 
government department with the ultimate respons ibil ity for the management of much of the 
government's legal bus iness . The Sol icitor-General has been the head of this office and chief 
government legal advisor. 
A lthough there are approximately 70 statutory duties conferred on the Attorney-General and 
Solicitor-General, in reality the Sol icitor-General exercises most of those powers and in some 
instances Solicito r-General powers c annot be exercised by the Attorney-General . In terms 
of c riminal prosecutions , in order to preserve the non-political exercise of this power , the 
Attorney -Gener al has g iven this power to the Solicitor-General . This is not a formal delegation , 
but a convention, as the Attorney-General retains political responsibility except when there is 
specific st atutory exclusion of the Attorney-General exercising a power . This convention arose 
after three unfor tunate interventions in criminal m atters by the Attorney-General in the 1 970s .  
McGrath in his article gives an account of these instances .22 The d iscretion to prosecute is in 
the hands of the police who pursue the case until the point of committal for tria l  when Crown 
Solicitors take over the case . Crown Solicitors a re lawyers in pr ivate practice who act as agents 
of the Solicitor-General, but they are appointed by the Go vernor-General and hold office at 
the pleasure of the Attorney-General . This system has been des igned to ensure the cr iminal 
prosecution process is free from polit ical influence and therefore has the confidence and trust of 
the public in the exerc ise of this public power . 
Apart from criminal m atters however, the Attorney-General represents the government and 
appears on behalf of it in civil litigat ion . Apart from this role , McGrath emphasises that the 
Attorney-General has a separate role , one of representing the publ ic i nterest, and in this role 
s/he must act independently of pol itical interests. The Attorney-General is also responsible 
to Parliament for the actions of the Solic itor-General and the Crown Law Office. In this 
Minister ial role the Attorney-General is respons ible for the conduct of all l it igation . The role of 
protection of the public interest is al so seen in the provision for the Attorney -General to report 
to Parliament on any provis ion that is contrary to the NZ  Bill of Rights Act 1990. In reality 
the advice is prepared e ither by the Crown Law Office or the Minis try of Justice and given 
22 In 1 974 the then Attorney-General personally gave his consent under the Official Secrets Act 1 95 1  
to prosecute Dr Sutch but publicly expressed his distaste for the Act. The second case was in 1 976 
when the Attorney-General decided to stay criminal proceedings against the Ford Motor Company 
that refused to make superannuation deductions after a press statement from the then Prime Minister 
Muldoon whose action became subject to subsequent proceedings in Fitzgerald v Muldoon. The 
third instance was in 1980 when the Attorney-General made submissions on behalf of the Crown in a 
sentencing case before the Court of Appeal and made a procedural error that resulted in the sentence 
being reduced. No Attorney-General has appeared in the criminal jurisdiction since that time. 
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to the Attorney-General who then presents it to Parl iament.
23 Giv ing legal advice to Cabinet
and parliamentary colleagues is also an essential part of the role. Part of the argument for the
Attorney-General being a member of the Cabinet is to enable the transfer of such advice when 
decisions are be ing made . There is an argument the Attorney-General should not be a part of 
Cabinet but independent of it. However, I bel ieve the New Zealand system of the politi cal
Attorney-General in Cabinet and the non-political Sol icitor-General outs ide government 
provides the best balan ce to ensure government receive the best legal advi ce.
24 
The roles of both legal officers have evolved through practi ces and conventions that reflect the 
essential character of the New Zealand constitution . The absence of a written consti tutional 
text has meant the legal officers have relied on specifi c legislation or convention to provide the 
framework and legitimacy for the exer cise of t he public power of their respective o ffices. An 
understanding of the constitutional role of the publi c offices depends on the nature of the power 
they exer cise . While a full analysis of the nature of the powers of both the Attorney-General 
and the Solicitor-General requires a study of the 'lived ' experience of both Offices and the 
relationship between them ,  this paper will focus on a textual analysis of the various reviews of 
the structures , pro cesses, principles , rules, conventions of both the Office of Soli citor-General 
and the Office of Crown Law. 
Solicitor-General - New Zealand 
In his article on the contemporary role of the Soli citor -General, David Collins QC identifies 
five distinct functions, namely, Chief Executive of the Crown L aw  Office; principal counsel 
for the Crown ; pr incipal legal adviser to the Crown ; Supervisor of the prosecution of indictable 
cr ime ; and constitutional/Law Officer functions. The distinguish ing characteristic id entified 
by both former Soli citor-Generals as fundamental to the exer cise of the ir role is independence. 
The delivery of a ccurate free and frank legal advice requires independence. Decisions relating 
to the prosecution role also requires independence in the sense of being non-politi cal. In reality 
both these roles are fulfilled not only by the Soli citor-General but by employees of the Crown 
Law Office and private sector law firms who have been appointed as agents to undertake 
prosecutions on behalf of the Soli citor -General. 
23 My practice as Attorney-General was to accept the advice but on occasions I would meet with the 
officials to discuss the advice if I did not agree with their opinion. I would also discuss with colleague 
Ministers how their legislation could be amended to make it Bill of Rights compliant. 
24 I would note however that it is difficult if not impossible for the Attorney-General to act contrary to
the decision of the executive because of the notion of collective responsibility. The convention of 
some level of independence for the Attorney-General is not strong enough to overrule the collective 
responsibility convention. In my experience the skill of the Attorney-General is to ensure that conflict 
does not arise . 
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Legislative support for the independent role is sparse but consistent with the lack of 
consti tutional statutory infrastructure . Thi s independen ce is expressed in the fact that although 
the Soli citor-General is appointed under the State Services Act 1988, the position is not time 
limited but held at will and the per formance review of the position is confined to the role of 
Chief Exe cutive of the Crown Law Office and does not include the role oflegal advisor and 
advocate of the government.25 The Constitution Act 1986 makes no referen ce to the Attorney ­
General but se ctions 9A , B and C prescribe the appointment of the Soli citor-General (must be 
a lawyer of 7 years' experience); the right of the Soli citor-General to exercise the powers of 
the A ttorney-General; and that with the consent of the Attorney-General those powers may be 
delegated to the Deputy So li citor-General . The rationale for these provisions was to reinforce 
the independent non-political ro le of the Solicitor-General . 
The pr in cipal source of authority for the role of the Soli citor-General and the Cro wn Law 
Office is found in the Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business.16 The idea 
of Cab inet Directions arose originally in 1 993 from the review of the Crown Law Office that 
a c companied the reform of the government service in 1980s as a result of the introduction 
of a neo-liberal approa ch to public sector institutions and policy-making . John M cGrath 
des cribes the Directions as defin ing the roles of the Attorney-Gener al, the Soli citor-General 
and the Crown Law Office and importantly identifying the categories of work that were to 
be considered core government legal business as distinct from work that comprised "other 
legal services" not being special to government but common to those required by any large 
commercial business . These Directions that were included in the Cabinet Manual enabled the 
Soli citor-General to retain control of core legal business and prevent a general contra cting 
out of the work  to the private legal sector as neoliberal doctrine would suggest should o ccur. 
Although the Cabinet Manual has no legal enfor ceabili ty it has developed as a model of best 
practi ce for the exercise of publi c power by the Executive . The Cabinet Manual is regarded 
by some as having a const itutional authority but at best it has the status of a consti tutional 
convention and it is subject to change by the Executive. The recent Directions of 20 16 refle ct 
the most re cent PIF review of both the office of Solicitor-General and the Crown Law Office .  
The current Directions stipulate that "The Law Officers, the Attorney-General and Solicitor­
General, have constitutional responsibility for determining the Crown's view of what the law 
is, and ensuring that the Crown's litigation is properly conducted." What is interesting abou t 
this statement is that there is no acknowledgment of the role of the courts, in parti cula r, the 
Supreme Court, in the interpretation of the consti tution . Th is is not surprising given that the 
current government and At torney-General opposed the establishment of the Supreme Court 
25 State Sector Act 1 988, s. 44. 
26 Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business 20 1 6, Cabinet Manual 2008, Cabinet Office, 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, New Zealand, Appendix C. 
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and any suggest ion that it may have a constitutional ro le.27 The fear of the courts pre-empting 
the total sovereignty of Parliament in law m aking is c learly seen in the text of the Directions. 
The c lear attribution of the constitutional role of the Law Officers makes their independence 
of importance and since the Attorney-General has a political ro le, the onus of const itutiona l 
legal advice c learly fal ls onto the Office of Solicitor-General and by delegation the officers 
i n  the Crown Law Office. There is a curious statement in the Directions relating to the 
role of the Attorney -General that has been incorporated into the new Directions. Under the 
head ing "conduct of core Crown legal matters ", it is stated "Core Crown legal matters must
be conducted cons istent with any applicable va lues of the Attorney-General, as expressed by
t he Attorney-Genera l from time to time." [para 13]. I have not yet found a statement of these
va lues. 
Bas ically the Directions are concerned w ith ident ifying who does what legal work and who 
gives legal advice to government Ministers of depar tments . The recasting of what is core 
government legal business and what falls into the category of other is in effect an opening 
for more lega l advice and representation to be contracted out to the private sector or to 
be undertaken by departmental or government agency lawyers . Whether this may be seen 
as an undermining of the independence of the Solicitor-General's and Crown Law Office 
independence is too early to assess as these new rules came into force on 10 May 2016. They 
do appear however to have emerged from the various rev iews of both Offices that have been 
ongoing s ince 20 11. It is however of interest that the Solicitor-General at the time of the 
reviews , David Collins QC, noted that he believed "that the Solicitor-General and Crown Law 
Office should continue their ro les as the pr incipa l lawyers who both advise and represent the 
Crown in litigation".  He further commented : "In my experience, there is considerable advantage 
to one organisation providing both a whole-o f-government approach to the advice they give 
Ministers and key decision-makers and who take a finely tuned public interest approach to the 
way t hat litigation is conducted in the name of the Crown."28 He expresses similar support for 
the Solicitor-General retaining oversight of the prosecution of ind ictable crime because of the 
public in terest considerations in such matters. Explicitly he identifies the primary concern, 
namely, " . .. those decisions are best made by those who do not have a direct interest in the 
investigation or prosecution of particular cases. "29 
He did however support the creat ion of a Government Lega l Services modelled on the United 
Kingdom Government Legal Service that is managed under the auspices of the Treasury 
Solicitor in London. He then outlines the advantage of such a service to assist with the 
27 For a discussion of the arguments supporting and opposing the establishment of the Supreme 
Court see: Margaret Wilson, "Establishing a Supreme Court for New Zealand", chapter in Andrew 
Stockley and Michael Littlewood (eds) The New Zealand Supreme Court: The First Ten Years, (20 1 5) 
LexisNex.is, Wellington. 1 - 1 9. 
28 Collins, n 1 7, para 57 
29 Ibid, para 58 
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recrui tment  of government department lawyers ; as sis t wi th training and developmen t  of 
government l awyer s; assis t in the rationali sation of legal informa tion services and libraries ; 
and provide a focal point for co-ordinating the way in which l awyers in government respond to 
issues. David Collins QC was promoted to the High Court in March 2012 and a new Solicitor­
General Michael Heron was appoin ted. Heron 's appoin tment was a little unusual in that he 
was not a QC and had only recently left a partnership in a commercial practice to go to the 
independent bar. His task was to implement for the government the recommendations of the 
follow ing review s. 
Performance Information Framework Reviews of Solicitor-General 
and Crown Law Office 
The review of the public office of Solicitor-General and the Crown Law Office was part of 
the larger Better Public Service reforms in the state sector.30 There were t hree specific review s 
- firs tly, the PIF Formal Review of the Crown Law Office3 1  undertaken by two independent
reviewers, Paula Rebs tock and Peter Doolin on behalf of the S tate Services Commission . The
terms of reference for the review no ted tha t in 1 986, and aga in in 2006 and 2011  the ques tion
had been rai sed whether one per son can successfully fill all the roles of Solici tor -General ,
namely, principal legal advisor and principal counsel to the Crown, supervisor of indictable
offences and chief executive of the Crown Law Office. The pr incipal purpose of the review w as
to determine whether these variou s roles were being discharged effec tively and efficiently. It
was clear from the scope of the review that the primary ques tion was whether to separate out
the roles of legal advisor and chief executive. Further the review was directed a t  recommend ing
ways to improve the quality and cost effectiveness of the Crown Law O ffice and the prosecution
service. The terms of reference explici tl y s tated that "Changes recommended by  this review 
should take account of the government's expectation of improved services at lower cos t s."32
Apart from the Formal Review there were two o ther reviews tha t were designed to implement 
the recommendations of the State Services Formal Review. The firs t  was the Review of 
Prosecution Services undertaken by  John Spencer,33 and the second was the Review of the 
Role and Functions of the Solicitor-General and the Crown Law Office by  Miriam Dean QC 
30 Better Public Services Advisory Group Report, November 20 1 1  (www.ssc.govt.nzJsites/alVfiles/bps­
report-nov20l l_0.pdf 
3 1  October 20 1 1 ,  State Service Commission (http://www.ssc.govt.nzJsites//all/files/pif-crownlaw­
review-oct l l .pdf) 
32 Review of the Roles and Functions of the Solicitor-General and Crown Law Office, Terms of 
Reference, August 20 1 1 ,  2, www.crownlaw.govt.nzJassets/Uploads/Reports/clo-pif-report.pdf. 
3 3  Review of Public Prosecution Services, John Spencer, September 20 1 1 ,  http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz1 
assets/Uploads/Reports/prosecution-review-20 1 1 .pdf 
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and Dav id Co chrane.
34 There was also a Follow Up Rev iew of the Crown Law O ffice in Mar ch 
201 3  to assess the implementat ion of the re commendat ions in the prev ious Reports.
35 In this
Follow-Up Rev iew Crown Law rece ived a qual ified pass mark w ith the general thrust be ing 
' commendable' p rogress but more needs to be done. It was clear from th is rev iew that there 
were issues with retain ing qual ified sta ff and the relat ionship w ith cl ients was frag ile w ith
in cons istent p ract ice st ill ev ident. The Rev iew then set out what the foture should look l ike for
Crown Law ,  namely, "In four years ' t ime Crown Law would have transformed its strategy and
operat ing model to underp in its su ccess in meeting its core purpose to support the rule of
law . .. "36 The Report is full of management speak masking the real ity that the trans it ion
has been bruis ing for many. It wil l be interest ing to see at the end of the four-year per iod
(2017) whether Crown Law is meeting the expe ctat ions of the government and whether the 
recommendations of the v arious rev iews have been implemented in full . 
The Review of Prosecut ion Serv ices was driven by the increase in costs that were attributable 
to increased ind ictable p rosecut ion charges . The terms of reference a cknowledged the need 
to  secure the integr ity of the legal system in the publ ic interest, as well as the efficien cy and 
cost effect iveness of the Prosecut ion Serv ice. The Rev iew at the outset acknowledged the 
complexity of the task in assess ing the e ffect iveness and e fficiency of the Prosecut ion Serv ice 
because of external it ies such as a change in leg islat ion, in part icular , the Crim inal Procedure Act 
201 3 that establ ished new procedures for the condu ct of cases, and the need to v iew the crim inal 
law pro cess as a whole to determine the real nature of the costs. The purpose of the Rev iew 
however was to ensure the recommendations supported the pol icy objectives of the government, 
in part icular those in the Crim inal Procedure Act .  
The Review was extens ive and thorough and con cluded : "I . . .  have not found any fundamental 
flaws in the current prosecut ions serv ice, my recommendat ions fo cus on how to improve the 
status quo. In the short term, the re commendat ions aim to identify immed iate cost sav ings, to 
provide for better data collect ion and to improve overall efficien cy. In the long term, they a im to 
ident ify ways in which the current system could be made more susta inable." (p. l 0) The Rev iew 
d id find however that the overs ight of the Prosecut ion Serv ice by Crown Law wa s weak and 
that poor data collect ion made transparency d ifficult . The overall effect of the recommendat ions 
was to res t ructure and improve the management and administrat ion of the Crown Law Office in 
relat ion to the Prosecut ion Serv ice. For example , the appo intment of a Deputy Ch ief Execut ive 
34 A Review of the Role and Functions of the Solicitor-General and the Crown Law Office, Miriam Dean 
CNZM QC and David Cochrane, 24 February 20 12, http://www.crownlaw.govt.nzJassets/Uploads/ 
Reports/review-2012 .pdf 
35  PIF Follow Up Review of the Crown Law Office (Crown Law), March 20 1 3, State Services 
Commission, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, www.crownlaw. 
govt.nzJassets/U ploads/Reports/pif-crownlaw-fol!owup.pdf 
36 Follow Up Review of the Crown Law Office (Crown Law), March 20 13, State Services Commission,
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to provide better oversight was recommended and such an appointment has been made. There 
was no recommendation to further contract out prosecution services, but instead to improve the 
management of the Crown Solicitor Network that includes the private sector lawyers who are 
appointed by the Governor-General to the role of Crown Solicitor. While the Police Prosecution 
Service was held to provide a much improved prosecution service than previously, some 
departmental prosecution services required improvement and great oversight. 
Although the emphasis throughout the Review Report was on cost efficiency and effectiveness, 
there was recognition of the need to protect the public interest in ensuring that the exercise 
of the prosecurial power is exercised independently and free from undue political or public 
pressure, both in appearance and in reality. In exercising that independence however the 
Review noted there must be a balance with accountability, consistency and cooperation with 
investigators. Where and how that balance in achieved is difficult to assess in theory. In practice 
the decision to prosecute or not is an important one that requires independence. The 20 1 3/ 14  
Annual Review of  the Crown Law Office raised the question whether the current funding model 
was encouraging plea bargaining by defendants in order to avoid the costs of lengthy trials. 
The Crown Law officials acknowledged this inherent tendency in the system because of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 20 1 3  but were encouraging stakeholders to report inappropriate plea 
bargaining. So far they said they had found no complaints had been warranted.37
The Committee also raised the issue of the size of Crown Solicitors ' private profit, given that 
they are delivering a public service and are largely funded by the taxpayer. The Crown Law 
Office responded that because of the nature of the relationship with Crown Solicitors it does 
not have the information to quantify their profits. The Office however noted maintaining 
profitability was an essential element of ensuring quality representation but conceded that there 
was an appropriate level of private profit as the taxpayer's expense but no figure was suggested. 
There was however a new reporting framework for assessing the work of the Crown Solicitors 
network through the new Public Prosecution Unit. It is too early to assess the implications of 
these new systems but it is apparent that the Parliamentary Committee is aware of possible 
negative implications. The Office was able to report that although the Office is employing fifty 
fewer staff than before the Reviews, it is receiving a "good" rating for its management and 
control environment from the Office of the Audit-General. Its financial information systems and 
controls have improved to a "very good" rating. It would appear that in terms of management 
and administration the Crown Law Office has successfully implemented the recommendations 
of the Prosecution Services Review. 
The second Review of the Role and Functions of the Solicitor-General and the Crown Law 
Office had a different focus. It was to determine whether the various roles of the 
37 Report of the Justice and Electoral Committee, 3 ,  www.parliament.nz/en/pb/sc/scl/justice-and­
electoral/tab/report This is an issue of public concern as indicated by recent protests when murder 
charges were reduced to manslaughter in the death of a child. 
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Sol icitor -Gen era l should b ecome separate. The R ev iew dec ided they shou ld no t b e  formally
separat ed becaus e such a separation would w eaken the cr it ica l adv ic e  rol e of the Solicitor­
General and incr ease th e Crown 's l eg al r isk. As noted in th e  r ecomm endat ions the advantages 
of separation could be achiev ed through the appointment of a D eputy Chi ef Executive si tting 
between th e Solic itor -G eneral and Deputy Sol ic itors-Gen eral to signal d el egated r esponsibili ty 
for organ isational management . Th e R ev iew al so d id not r ecomm end a separat ion of the adv ic e  
and advocacy rol es because th e fusion of the ro les enabl es better managem en t  of th e Crown 's 
legal r isk. The allocation ofl egal work wa s r evis ed and r efined a nd is now incorporated in the 
Directions in the Cabin et Manual . ( outl in ed above). Ov erall th e Crown Law Office  ret ained 
overs ight of the Crown' s l egal work but ther e  ha s been consid erable r estruct uring of the Offic e. 
Apar t from the Publ ic Pro secut ion s Unit, there  is the Crown So lic itors N etwork, and the 
Government Legal Ne twork -all part of promoting a 'on e crown ' approach to the management 
of legal r isk. Overall th e R ev iew's r ecommendat ion s c entr ed on improved cost efficiency and 
con sis t ency through c entralisation. For examp le, the Government L egal network is d esigned to 
prov ide  bet t er coordina t ion of the Crown 's legal bus ines s  a s  w el l  as attempting to improve the 
qual ity of the legal s ervice, in particular, in some departments such a s  Correction s. 
Performance 
The implication s of all th ese  structural and managem en t  changes have y et to be fully a sses sed .  
As a former At torney-General I attempt ed to aff ect some  change in the d el iv ery of public l egal 
services but w ithout much success . My focu s was on gr eater coordination and improvem ent 
in the qua lity of th e services . Both th es e  issues have b een addressed in th e r ecent R evi ew s. 
There  wa s a need for change but what is l ess c ertain is how these changes w ill imp act on the 
traditiona l role of the So licitor -General and in particular th e indep endence of th e Offic e  to 
g ive  exper t ,  free and frank advice .  To a large ext ent the indep endence of the Solicitor-Gen eral 
role depends on the qualiti es of th e person holding the pos ition. As indicat ed above th e 
Solic itor-General to overs ee th e r estructuring M ichael Heron QC was appo int ed for five y ears 
but resigned after thr ee years . H e  ha s been r eplaced by Una Jagos e who had worked within 
Crown Law heading th e Legal R isk t eam but in 2014 had been appoint ed Acting Director of 
t he Government Communication S ecur ity Bur eau. She was r ecru it ed back to th e po si tion of 
Solic itor-Genera l in November 2015 . She has on ly r ecently b een made a QC. Michael H eron 
also rece ived the designat ion of QC after appointment to the Office of So licitor-Gen eral . 
In the past the tradit ion had been appointmen t s  w er e  made from the ranks of QCs who ar e 
acknowledged a s  l eader s in th e l ega l profes sion, in particular as litigators . 
While the various r ev iew s  hav e focus ed on administration and managem en t changes, noth ing 
appears to have been implem ent ed to streng then the ind ep end ence of th e Solic itor-Gen eral .
How well th e Offic e  manages th e Crown 's and the government' s l egal r isk as w ell a s  the public
legal interest w ill again d epend largely on the qua lit ies of the ind ividual ho lding the o ffice
and the relat ion ship betw een the Solic itor -General and At torney-General . The government's
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assessment o f  the performance of  the Crown Law is seen in the 2014/15 Annua l  Report that 
outlines the performance framework that sets out the categor ies o f  work to be assessed. The 
c lient survey on Crown lega l adv ice and services rated the performance between January and 
June 2015 at 86% overa ll sat isfact ion; 84% for respons iveness , re levancy, accuracy and c larity; 
86% for t ime liness ; and 86% for va lue for money. There a lso appeared to be no ser ious issues 
w ith other categor ies such as the Crown So lic itor Network and Government Lega l Network. 
W ith these rati ngs it is assumed a ll is well but it must be remembered that these rat ings are a ll 
defined within a manager ia l framework and government sat isfact ion rat ing . The leve l o f  trust 
in the rat ings depends on the leve l o f  trust in the state service genera lly and the State Services 
Comm iss ion in particular.38 The bas is on wh ich performance is assessed is determined by the 
government's po licy targets that reflect both a rea l need in the com un ity but a lso the po lit ica l 
necess ity to de liver those targets. Whi le performance assessment is an entrenched too l o f  
managerial ism , its value i n  respond ing to what the pub lic needs as d ist i nct from government's 
performance pr iorit ies must be understood .39 
The quest ionable va lue o f  performance rev iews is h igh lighted in the per formance assessment 
o f  Crown Law's respons ib i lity to prov ide independent lega l adv ice to the Crown .40 The
performance is assessed in terms of  the opening of  new matters and the c losure o f  those matter s. 
In other words , the time it took to turn around adv ice. I am not sure about how the qua lity o f
the adv ice was assessed except fo r  the sat isfact ion measure expressed by  the Attorney-General
which rated such adv ice as good or exce llent. A lthough time liness is a necessary character ist ic
o flega l adv ice it is not a p roxy for qua lity. Interestingly the Annual Repo rt notes the impact
o f  Crown Law's adv ice is gauged by looking at i nternat ional indexes rat ing New Zealand 's 
standing in matters re lated to just ice .
For example , the Wor ld Just ice Project Ru le o f  Law I ndex 2015 in which New Zea land was 
rated first out of  15 amongst regiona l East As ia and Pac ific ne ighbours and it states "scores 
above average for countr ies o f  s im ilar incomes." I have contr ibuted to this survey and the focus 
is on corrupt ion and it is true that New Zea land rates we ll on issues of  corrupt judges and court 
a dmin istrators. Other internationa l  Indexes referred to include the Berte lsm ann Index, the Wor ld 
38 See Investigation into SSC conduct of MFAT leaks inquiry, June 20 1 6, Ombudsman Office. This 
opinion found the investigation was seriously flawed and harmed the reputation of a senior diplomat 
who was accused of the misconduct during the consultation process on the restructuring of :MF AT but 
also held he was not responsible for the leak. 
39 Under the Government's Better Public Services policy, specific targets are set in some areas, for 
example, in Justice there are targets to reduce crime by 20% by June 201 7. Changes in Crown Law 
performance generally and specifically are designed to support the achievement of these targets . The 
changes in the prosecution service is an example of the intention to produce better performance. 
40 Crown Law Annual Report, 2014/15 ,  www.crownlaw.govt.nz/publications/annual-reports/ 
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Bank Governance Index, and Transparency Internati onal 's C orrupti on Percepti ons Index.
41
While a la ck of corruption is essentia l for the ru le of law for both domesti c and internationa l  
credi bi lity, it is not the only indi cator of qua lity independent advi ce. I w ou ld need t o  do  
more w ork but often these indexes seem t o  be externa lly fo cussed and a t ool of a g lobalised 
framew ork for regu lati on and control. I think a case cou ld be made for this a ssessment in 
the terti ary sector. At least in New Zea land the ranking of an internationa l b ody seem s more 
influentia l than a nati ona l as sessment of va lue or per formance. 
Conclusion 
I have no easy answer as t o  how t o  supp ort the independence of the S oli cit or-General and 
lega l advi ce under New Zea land's current constituti ona l  arrangements . It seems obvious t o  me 
however that much depends not only  on the qua lity of pers on h olding the positi on but a ls o  ju st 
as impor tantly on the credibi lity of the pub li c  service as an instituti on and the suppor t it receives 
from the pub lic .  I re cent ly attended a forum of seni or pub li c  officials t o  discuss freedom of 
information. Chath am H ouse rules app lied s o  I sha ll not recount the matter s rai sed but on 
reflecti on I cou ld understand the very diffi cult p ositi on of these officia ls wh o must execute 
the delivery of pub li c  p oli cy for the g overnment but a ls o  ensure that execution is within the 
law and public  interest. I rea lise thi s is not a new issue but in the context of the Ombudsman's 
Report on the MFAT leaks 42, it is obvious these senior pub li c  offi cials are vulnerab le with out 
the insti tuti ona l supp or t  of the State Services Commission. It is als o obvious that much also 
depends on the government and the Par liament respecting the constituti onal conventions and 
practi ces. In my experience this cannot a lways be re lied on. 
41  In  the New Zealand Report to Transparency International I wrote the chapter on the Judiciary, n 6
42 See Ombudsman Report n 38 . 
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